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WHY WE SHOULD ALL BE PLATONISTS 
 
Tim Robinson 
College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University 
Collegeville, Minnesota 
2002 
 
As my title suggests, I am going to try to persuade you tonight that we should all 
be Platonists.  That is really a rather bizarre thing to do.  Plato is generally conceded to 
have written very useful works for teaching philosophy, but his own philosophy has 
supposedly been decisively refuted long ago.  I am yet to meet a professional philosopher 
who will admit to being a Platonist.  On the other hand, when I have told non-
philosophers about my project, the response has been more along the lines “but of course 
that’s right.”  I was glad to hear that many of you in the audience tonight are not 
professional academic philosophers, for that increases the chances I will get a 
sympathetic hearing.  Because my goal is so bizarre, I must be careful to be very clear 
about precisely what I’m defending. 
 In the first place, my focus tonight is on the area of ethics.  I am not going to 
argue that we should be Platonists in our physics, or mathematics, or social theory—only 
in our ethics.  The job of the ethicist, as I conceive it, is basically to make sense of the 
ethical dimension of our lives.  The ethical dimension is the one in which we make 
choices and judge the choices that others make, by identifying choices as good or bad, 
better or worse, right or wrong.  We have values by which we make these choices and 
judgments.  The ethicist must make sense of these values and these activities for us.  The 
notion of “making sense” of something is deliberately vague.  In the present context, we 
can say that making sense of ethics requires us to answer three sorts of questions about it. 
 First are the metaphysical questions.  As a general matter, metaphysics tries to 
answer questions like “What are the basic realities?  What kinds of things are there in the 
world?”  In ethics, our values are expressed as guidelines for choosing actions and 
policies.  The guidelines may take the form of rules, or may be expressed as ideals to be 
emulated.  The crucial metaphysical question for ethics, then, is “What are these things?  
What kind of real existence do they have?  Where do they come from?” 
 Then there are epistemological questions, or questions about knowledge.  How do 
we know these rules are correct?  How are ethical judgments to be justified? 
 The metaphysical and epistemological questions can be asked about any science 
or discipline, but the third set of questions is peculiar to ethics.  These are what we may 
call the motivational questions.  Why should I follow the rules that ethics identifies?  
What is there in human psychology that makes it possible to follow such rules? 
 Every theory of ethics must address these three sorts of questions.  My claim 
about Platonism is that it does this better than the currently available alternatives.  I am 
not arguing that it is the best, or ultimate, or final theory, that we will never see a better 
one.  I claim only that in the present state of ethical discussion, Platonism is the best 
option.  It is a theory whose time has come.  Or rather, since it was the dominant theory 
in much of antiquity and the Middle Ages, it is a theory whose time has come again. 
 To show this, I will offer a very sketchy survey of the current state of affairs in 
ethical theory, with a view to showing what is wanting in the available theories.  It will 
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be fairly easy to see how Platonism shares some of the strengths of these theories.  In the 
process, the point of great vulnerability in Platonism will become clear as well.  I will 
then try to defend Platonism precisely at that point of vulnerability. 
 Now to the first part of my argument, which begins with a whirlwind tour of the 
recent history of ethics.  (I suppose only a philosopher would refer to the last one hundred 
years as “recent.”)  I should warn you that the history I will describe is limited to the 
mainstream of ethical discussion in the English-speaking world.  I am no master of 
German Idealism or Phenomenology or any of the versions of Post-modernism, nor do I 
have more than a nodding acquaintance with non-Western philosophies, so I cannot 
predict how my arguments would be received by philosophers in those traditions.  
Working with the material I know best, and speaking to people steeped in the same 
tradition as myself, this argument seems to me a persuasive one. 
 For much of the twentieth century the debate over the foundations of ethics was 
essentially a dispute between the Utilitarians and the Deontologists.1  The debate took 
this form in part because each of these theories was strong at exactly the point where the 
other theory was weak.  For Utilitarianism in its classical form, the ultimate good was 
pleasure.  The phenomenon of pleasure is not as clear and simple as some philosophers 
and psychologists have thought, but compared to many other concepts deployed in ethics, 
it is at least relatively unproblematic.  That pleasure and pain are real elements of our 
experience cannot reasonably be denied.  Moreover, although the experiences of pleasure 
and pain are in some sense subjective, there are generally accepted, objective, we may 
even say “scientific” ways of determining what sorts of things please or pain people, and 
of determining what sorts of circumstances produce the objects or bring about the states 
of affairs that people enjoy.  These facts are sometimes expressed by saying that 
Utilitarianism is a “naturalistic” theory.  This is a much-abused term, but the general idea 
seems to be that Utilitarianism makes no appeal to anything philosophically suspicious.  
You need not believe in any mysterious, “supernatural” entities or in some special 
cognitive faculty by which such entities are known in order to be a Utilitarian.  So the 
metaphysical and epistemological questions are fairly easy for the Utilitarian to answer. 
 A similar point can be made about Utilitarianism’s answer to the question of 
motivation.  In explaining how human beings are motivated by morality, they fall back 
again on the principles of pleasure and pain.  Of course, it’s not as simple as claiming that 
behaving morally is pleasant, and the opposite painful.  The account of moral motivation 
is more complicated than that.  But Utilitarians are sure that they can ultimately relate 
moral motivation to these principles, and surely no one can deny that pleasure and pain 
do have motivational force. 
 As the century advanced, Utilitarianism was elaborated in various ways, and we 
may question whether all of its variants retained undiluted this strength of the simpler, 
classical theory.  The versions favored by economists, for example, tend to replace 
“pleasure” with “preference satisfaction,” and there is room for doubt whether this 
represents an improvement in every respect.2  But I don’t want to go into that here.  It is 
generally conceded that even when more abstract notions than pleasure are put into play, 
Utilitarian theories remain more grounded in ordinary experience, less suspicious, than 
theories of the Deontological sort. 
 Deontological theories appeared in various forms as well.  The beginning of the 
century witnessed G.E. Moore’s defense of the proposition that goodness is an objective 
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but “non-natural” property of good things.  Moore also famously claimed that goodness 
cannot be defined, so we must fall back on some sort of perception or intuition in order to 
recognize it and to distinguish better and worse.3  The next classical statement of 
Deontology was that of W.D. Ross.  The objects of ethical intuition in his view were not 
so many subcategories of the good, but certain ethical principles, which he considered to 
be self-evident in much the way that principles of logic and mathematics are.4  This 
version of Deontology can be thought of as an attempt to preserve a Kantian sort of 
ethics, while abandoning the epistemological apparatus through which Kant sought to 
establish the principles of ethics as synthetic a priori propositions.  The theory of John 
Rawls and others in a similar vein are often presented, under the heading of 
contractualism, as a third alternative to both Utilitarianism and Deontology, but Rawls at 
least regarded his theory as Kantian in spirit.  He replaces the Kantian epistemology with 
the scenario of a social contract entered into in the so-called “original position” behind a 
“veil of ignorance,” and so on.  But I will take him at his word that the intent remains 
Kantian.5  Finally, there have been, over the last twenty years or so, numerous defenses 
of a purer form of Kantianism.  If the modern Kantians do not attempt to restore the 
entire “transcendental” apparatus, they do try to ground ethics in Kant’s categorical 
imperative, to interpret and apply the categorical imperative in a way faithful to Kant’s 
intentions and guided by Kant’s own examples, and to defend Kant’s more dubious 
ethical claims against criticism.  We are still in the midst of this revival of Kantianism.6 
 All of these versions of Deontology share the same weakness.  Their ontological 
and epistemological credentials are not in good order.  Their accounts of the ontological 
status of ethical goods or principles, and their accounts of our cognitive access to these 
goods or principles, have not won wide acceptance.  The faculty of “ethical intuition” 
seems to be a cognitive function entirely sui generis, and has long been suspected of 
being a figment of the Deontologists’ imagination.  In the absence of a satisfactory 
account of ethical knowledge, the goods and principles of the Deontologists become 
vulnerable to reductive and destructive analyses of a Marxist or Freudian or other variety.  
Some of the recent revivers of Kantianism appear to have thought that they had solved 
these problems, but I have not yet come across a solution that I found compelling, and 
apparently I have lots of company in that respect.7  In sum, then, the Deontological 
theories stack up poorly against the “naturalism” of Utilitarian theories. 
 This is also true with regard to the other benefit of naturalism:  the ease with 
which the Utilitarian hopes to account for moral motivation.  The motive force of 
pleasure and pain is not disputed.  But how will the Deontologist explain our obedience 
to the dictates of ethical intuition?  They have generally maintained something to the 
effect that intuition is in itself motivating, and thus is capable of overriding the 
promptings of pleasure.  But ever since Hume declared that “Reason is and ought to be 
the slave of the passions,” most philosophers and psychologists in the West have denied 
that any merely cognitive function could possibly have motivating force by itself.  This 
has perhaps been accepted more as an article of faith than on evidential grounds, but the 
failure of Deontologists to give a plausible account of how reason or intuition could 
motivate has left the Utilitarians in possession of the field.   
 On the other hand, Deontology fared much better than Utilitarianism on another 
score.  One of our most deeply held ethical convictions is that the interests of other 
persons must carry independent weight in the deliberations of each of us.  That is, they 
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must carry some weight independent of how their satisfactions and frustrations indirectly 
impact our own.  Exactly whose interests must be taken into account, and how much 
weight they should be given, may vary from one instance of deliberation to another, and 
in a particular instance we may disagree over these issues.  Much of our deliberation 
involves weighing the strength of various obligations to different people to whom we 
stand in various relationships.  But that some interests of some others must be given 
independent weight in our decision-making is among the most deeply held and widely 
accepted of our ethical intuitions.  This is why some philosophers insist that Ethical 
Egoism, which rejects this intuition, is not an ethical theory at all.  
 Most of us of course claim intuitive warrant for more than this.  Note that as I 
have stated it, acceptance of the truth of this intuition is consistent with gross differences 
in the treatment of others.  It is even consistent with denying ethical status to some 
persons altogether.  For it only requires that we take some people other than ourselves 
into consideration.  But most of us believe that there is some minimum consideration to 
be given to all persons as such.  To be more precise, we might say that there are some 
interests which everyone has, and our deliberations must take these into account for 
everyone materially affected by the actions under deliberation, and further, that with 
respect to these interests, each person must initially be given equal consideration.  I say 
“initially” because a sophisticated deliberation may also assign different weights to some 
of the interests of different persons because of special rights or obligations they or we 
have, or because of our special relationships to them.  But such preferential treatment 
must, we say, be built up on a base line of equality. 
 The ideal of egalitarianism has not been embraced as widely or as vigorously as 
the principle, if I may call it that, of non-egotism.  The sentiment of equality has been 
widely expressed, in one form or another, both historically and geographically, but 
expression of this sentiment appears to be compatible with condoning radical inequalities 
in practice.  To take but one conspicuous example, among the more strident assertions of 
equality is that found in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, but for decades after the 
composition of that document, many stout defenders of its doctrine denied any 
inconsistency between the proclamation of universal equality and the institution of 
slavery.  A pessimist might argue that the idea of equality only really began to be taken 
seriously, as an element of ethical and political theory, in the 17th century, and that the 
realization of this theoretical ideal in practice is still far from complete.  Be that as it may, 
the notion that there is some sense in which we are all equal is firmly entrenched in 
contemporary ethical discourse, so we may count this, too, as a solidly grounded ethical 
intuition. 
 The Deontologists have stood fast by the principle of independent and equal 
consideration for the interests of others.  Their ethical principles included egalitarian 
requirements.  And their egalitarianism was on no different footing than the other aspects 
of their theories.  This has been the great merit of Deontology, and to it there corresponds 
the great demerit of Utilitarianism. 
 The Utilitarians interpreted the principle of utility as saying that the important 
thing is to bring about the greatest possible pleasure, regardless of whose pleasure it is.  
The principle thus requires that in assessments of utility, each person’s interests shall 
count equally.  In this way, Utilitarianism is egalitarian.  But it isn’t egalitarian enough.  
The classic criticism of Utilitarianism is to point out that weighting people equally when 
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assessing the inputs into the Utilitarian calculus does not mean requiring anything like 
equality in the distribution of goods that results from the calculus.  It may well turn out 
that a grossly inequitable distribution yields the largest balance of total pleasure over total 
pain, and if that is the case, Utilitarianism will require us to endorse that non-egalitarian 
outcome. 
 The simplest solution to this problem is to supplement the principle of utility with 
some principle of justice to guarantee fairness in the distribution of benefits.8  But this 
solution is less than satisfactory, for it gives rise to two other problems. 
 The first of these arises from the fact that what makes Utilitarianism so attractive 
in the first place is its “naturalism.”  But it is far from clear that a naturalistic account can 
be given of the supplementary principle of justice.  Lacking this, Utilitarianism’s greatest 
advantage over Deontology vanishes.  Utilitarianism invokes a principle as 
metaphysically and epistemologically suspect as those of the Deontologists.  Admittedly, 
many Utilitarians have thought they could give naturalistic accounts of justice.  I am not 
going to pronounce authoritatively that they have failed.  But their accounts do leave one 
uneasy, in the absence of a prior commitment to Utilitarianism. 
 The second problem concerns Utilitarianism’s promise to be congruent with a 
naturalistic account of moral motivation.  While they appeal merely to pleasure and pain, 
we are inclined to grant without much scrutiny that some such account can be worked 
out.   But when a principle of justice or equality is added to the principle of utility, we run 
up against this simple difficulty:  the motivating effect on me of my pleasure and pain is 
very different from the motivating effect force on me of someone else’s pleasure and 
pain.  That most of us feel some sympathy with others is evident.  Nearly everyone is 
prey to the occasional altruistic impulse.  But it is not at all evident that this tendency 
naturally and normally rises to the level of respect for all persons as such.  Indeed, our 
instincts seem to reach so far only as a result of assiduous cultivation in that direction.  
That being the case, one may well ask what motive one has to cultivate them that way.  
Indeed, might it not be much more prudent to repress one’s altruistic instincts?  
Hedonism gravitates toward provincialism if not egoism, and it is far from obvious that 
Utilitarianism has the resources to resist this force. 
 Thus, when Utilitarians try to supplement the original principle of utility with a 
principle of justice, there seems something terribly “ad hoc” about it.  Again, died-in-the-
wool Utilitarians offer to reduce justice to utility, but their explanations seem rather 
convoluted and artificial and insufficient. 
 So neither the Utilitarians nor the Deontologists have come up with an altogether 
satisfactory theory.  To make matters worse—or is it better?—in the last decades of the 
20th century a great many philosophers began to feel that there were important features of 
our ethical lives that both of these schools of thought had neglected.  Some of these 
critics were merely critical, others developed alternative theories, but for convenience I 
shall refer to them collectively as the “new theories.” I will lump Utilitarianism and 
Deontology together as the “traditional theories.”  
 Despite the title I have given them, the new theories are not altogether new, being 
professedly revivals of a way of looking at ethics that preceded the theories I am calling 
“traditional.”  Both the traditional schools took for granted that the primary focus of 
ethics ought to be duties or obligations, customarily spelled out in general rules of action.  
But the ethical thinkers of antiquity and the middle ages shared a different focus.  The 
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central question for these pre-modern thinkers was the question of happiness, and their 
explications of this notion directed their attentions to the shape of a human life 
considered as a whole, rather than to general rules for guiding particular actions.  
Concomitant with this was a focus on character as a major factor in determining the 
quality of one’s life.  The revival of this outlook in recent years is often referred to as 
“virtue ethics,” although the attention to virtue is but one aspect of these complex and 
diverse theories.9 
 Both virtue theorists and other new theorists have faulted the traditional theories 
for their belief that ethics could be reduced to a single coherent system within which all 
conflicts of values could be rationally resolved.  The new theorists tend to see 
deliberation not as a matter of deciding which ethical principle takes precedence in a 
given situation, but as striking a balance or harmony among competing values, a harmony 
reflected in numerous choices over a span of time, rather than being instantiated in each 
single choice.  They have also differed from the traditional theorists in admitting the 
possibility that there are situations in which ethical deliberation cannot be made to yield a 
unique result, and some have argued that situations can arise in which there is no 
ethically acceptable outcome available.  Some versions of this claim take the form of the 
“dirty hands” theory, the idea being that in some circumstances one is morally obligated 
to act in a way which is inconsistent with other moral obligations which one has in those 
circumstances.  These are not conflicts to be resolved by distinguishing prima facie from 
“all things considered” obligations.  The claim is rather that two or more obligations 
which remain binding on the agent cannot both be satisfied, so that any course of action 
chosen is in some way immoral.10  A less drastic version argues that some situations 
confront us with choices in which every alternative is detrimental to the agent’s character, 
so that even if the preferred alternative can be justified as morally preferable, the agent 
inevitably becomes a worse person as a result.11  Sometimes this is expressed by saying 
that there is not always a guaranteed, sure-fire way to avoid moral “costs” or genuine 
moral “losses.”  New theorists argue that the traditional theories encourage us to overlook 
such losses by their promise that one can always do the right thing, and one can always 
take comfort in the consciousness that one did do the right thing. 
 Utilitarianism has long come under criticism for being too demanding.12  
Utilitarians seem to make every decision an ethical decision, to be dominated by the aim 
of maximizing utility.  No department of our lives lies outside the jurisdiction of this 
principle, and since it both requires maximizing value and requires us to regard everyone 
as equal in the calculation of outcomes, the likely result for any but the entirely destitute 
is to require drastic sacrifices of one’s own good and the good of one’s loved ones for the 
sake of people less well off in the world.  Utilitarianism seems to demand that all of us 
behave in ways we have typically associated with saints and heroes.  Duty looms so large 
that nothing is above and beyond its call. 
 A related criticism which has come to the fore more recently, and is not always 
clearly distinguished from the former, is that Utilitarianism is incapable of doing justice 
to our particular attachments.  It is argued that love and friendship for particular people 
are inseparable from giving those people special consideration in our deliberations, and 
that the worth of these relationships in a human life is such that we must allow for, and 
ought to encourage such attachments.  It therefore becomes important to draw a line 
between ethically reprehensible favoritism and a kind of special regard for particular 
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persons that is ethically praiseworthy.  The claim against Utilitarianism, then, is that it 
has not the resources for making such a distinction, or indeed, for condoning such special 
consideration at all. 
 Deontologists have commonly been thought immune to these criticisms because 
they have kept a place in their theories for the rights and duties attaching to particular 
roles and relationships.  But lately it has been argued that, at least in its neo-Kantian 
versions, Deontology is just as liable to be over-demanding, or to do violence to 
particular attachments, or to do violence to particular attachments because it is too 
demanding, as is Utilitarianism.13   
 Many feminist approaches to ethics come within the boundary of what I call the 
“new theories.”  Feminists have faulted traditional theories for what they see as an 
overemphasis on abstract notions of justice and equality, characterized as a “masculine” 
approach to ethics, to the neglect or exclusion of the varying needs of particular 
individuals and the relationships and social structures capable of responding to such 
particular needs, a dimension of ethics typically embodied in feminine experience, but 
historically neglected by theory.  A promising development of this line of thought is what 
has been christened “care ethics.”14 
 This is an almost ludicrously sketchy summary of recent developments in ethics, 
but it is perhaps sufficient to justify a powerful impression that the traditional theories 
simply haven’t worked.  Utilitarianism and Deontology of course continue to have their 
defenders, and these have been especially occupied latterly with attempts to rebut the 
criticisms the new theorists have offered.  My view is that the further this strategy is 
pursued, the more convoluted and counter-intuitive the results become. 
 On the other hand, I do not believe we should draw the conclusion that the 
traditional theories should be supplanted by one of the new theories.  For it seems to me 
that to a large extent the new theories have not been offering alternative answers to the 
questions addressed by the traditional ones, but have instead been suggesting or assuming 
that other questions are more important.  What the traditional theories promised was 
specific guidelines on how to decide on a course of action in particular circumstances.  
The new theories, concentrating on ways of life and character, have endorsed certain 
dispositions, attitudes, or commitments seen as fundamental to the best life, and these 
sorts of ideals must be characterized in other, less precise ways than the traditional ethical 
rules.  To be sure, the new theorists believe that decision-making in particular cases is 
best guided by such ideals which, if less definite than rules, yet better capture what 
ethical life is all about.  Perhaps this is sufficient in some contexts.  But there are also 
contexts in which we need something more definite, and this is particularly true when we 
set out to articulate and defend a theory of human rights.  One of the things we want from 
an ethical theory is an account of such rights.  The problem is not so much that of 
identifying what rights we have or what rules we should prima facie follow.  Despite 
disagreement on some points, there is a strikingly large area of consensus on this.  The 
real difficulty is to give an account of the nature of such things, so that they don’t 
collapse under the Benthamite criticism that “natural rights are nonsense, and 
imprescriptible natural rights, nonsense upon stilts.”  Deontology promised an answer to 
this criticism, but the new theories have been otherwise occupied.  Philosophers with 
primary interests in rights have accordingly developed independent theories more or less 
taking rights as given, and textbooks have consequently canonized rights theory as a 
 8 
distinctive approach to ethics, alongside the others.  What we really want is a theory that 
can combine the strengths of the traditional theories and integrate them with the insights 
of the new theories, and in the process do justice to our intuitions about human rights. 
 My argument is that for this role, Platonism shows great promise.  But it is now 
high time I said what I mean by “Platonism.” 
 In a Platonic scheme, the fundamental concept of ethics is that of the Good.  All 
guidelines for human life are derived from the goal of life, which is happiness.  And 
happiness is conceived as the enjoyment of the Good.  So far, Plato is not in disagreement 
with the Utilitiarians.  But for the Utilitarians, the only thing good in itself, intrinsically 
good, is pleasure—an experience of a sentient being.  Anything else which is good must 
be so only extrinsically, in that it contributes to the realization of pleasure.  Here, Plato 
and the Utilitarians part company.  For the Platonist, to call a thing “good” in the sense 
relevant to ethics is to attribute to it an objective property—“objective” in the sense that 
the object’s possession of this property is independent of anyone’s recognizing that the 
object possesses it.  It is independent, likewise, of anyone’s appreciating, estimating, or 
taking pleasure in the object.  Contrary to the view typical among analytic philosophers, 
but in agreement with G.E. Moore, some things “just are” good.   Moreover, among good 
things, some are better than others.  Goodness is not manifested to the same degree or 
even in the same way in everything that shares it.  Some goods are qualitatively higher, 
and not merely quantitatively greater, than others.  In fact, the diversity of these 
manifestations is so great that it is possible to doubt that there is any unity to the class of 
things rightly called “good.”  The Platonic philosopher does not pretend to possess a 
single, univocal definition which captures that unity.  Indeed the belief in such a unity is 
perhaps better denominated a hope than a belief.  But it is—or can be—hope, not in the 
meager sense of wishful thinking, but in the stronger sense of confident expectation. 
 Platonic ethics is thus a form of ethical realism or objectivism, in that it interprets 
ethical judgments as asserting, either truly or falsely, the existence of goodness as an 
objective fact independent of the observer’s perceptions or interests.  It is misleading to 
call it a naturalistic theory, for in Moore’s terms, that would require that good be 
explicable solely in terms of the kinds of properties recognized by physical science, and I 
see no evidence that physical science now does or is about to make use either of the 
concept of the good or of any other concept that the good might plausibly be reduced to.  
Following Moore’s usage, then, we would have to say that goodness is a non-natural 
property.  Does this then commit the Platonist to some philosophically obnoxious mode 
of intuition by which this supernatural quality is to be apprehended?  The appearance that 
it does is what I earlier called the “great point of vulnerability” in Platonic ethics.  
Whether this weakness is merely apparent depends on whether we can give a coherent 
account of the way in which this quality of goodness is perceived, and on the subsequent 
judgment as to how philosophically obnoxious that account is.  If the perception of the 
good can be shown to be grounded in a not uncommon experience, then Platonism may 
even lay claim to a kind of “naturalism” in a loose sense of the term—the sense in which 
whatever is discerned in a sufficiently unproblematic empirical fashion can be called 
“natural.” 
 The belief in a unity which we do not clearly perceive among radically diverse 
goods in each of which we perceive some goodness can be expressed by distinguishing 
the Good in itself—the concept which would capture the unity of the class of goods—and 
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the goodness in things, which is how the unified good is refracted into its particular 
manifestations.  We might then go on to suppose that this admittedly inadequate account 
of how we see things corresponds to the way they really are:  that there is some one Good 
such that all the particular goods possess their goodness in dependence on it.  This is 
tantamount to the Platonic doctrine of participation. 
 Because of the belief that there is something like a form of the Good, the Platonist 
will hesitate to say that all good things are intrinsically good.  Strictly speaking, only the 
Good itself possesses its goodness independently of all other things.  The other goods 
derive their goodness from it, by virtue of their relationship to it.  In this sense, the 
goodness of the other things is extrinsic.  But there is yet an element of truth to the 
proposition that all good things are intrinsically good.  For it captures the idea that 
goodness is not in the eye of the beholder, or in the esteem of the evaluator.  Furthermore, 
it preserves the notion that the goodness of a thing is not merely accidentally connected 
to its other properties.  This is the rock on which Moore’s notion of goodness as a simple 
property, comparable to “yellow,” came to grief.  In contemporary terminology, we may 
think of goodness as a supervenient property:  it is possible to state the properties on 
which goodness supervenes without noting that goodness supervenes on them, but insofar 
as those properties represent one way of manifesting goodness, it is not possible for an 
object to possess those properties without, to that extent, being good. 
 But why should we take our perception of goodness in a thing as a reliable index 
to some objective property of the thing?  And if we feel ourselves inclined to describe 
this experience, comparing it to many similar experiences, as the apprehension of some 
greater good lying beyond all its manifestations, why should we give in to this 
inclination?  I have already described belief in the unity of goods as a kind of leap of 
faith.  Surely the belief in the existence of the form of the Good is an even greater leap.  
Is there any way to defend such a leap?  Perhaps some element of faith, or as I suggested 
earlier, of hope, is ineliminable here, but can we at least assure ourselves that the 
platform from which we make the leap is solid ground?  I believe that we can, and that 
we can reduce the component of sheer faith in this leap by showing that the Platonic 
account of our experience of goodness is a more apt way of capturing the experience than 
the available alternatives.   
 I shall approach the Platonic interpretation of the experience in two stages, 
beginning with a way of describing it which is not specifically Platonic; this description 
will be more nearly neutral than a full-blown Platonic account would be.  My hope is that 
the aptness of this description will be readily recognized.  I will then try to show how the 
Platonic account of value does justice to this experience by elaborating on the simpler 
description.  If that succeeds, it will supply me with my “empirical foundation,” my 
“sufficiently unproblematic” Platonic epistemology of ethics.   
 My strategy here is suggested by the observation that in a Platonic scheme, the 
differences between ethical experience and aesthetic experience are negligible.  Since we 
in the modern world seem more alert to the aesthetic than to the ethical aspects of 
experience—and perhaps this is a universal feature of human nature—I will begin by 
reflecting on a very simple and very common aesthetic experience. 
 Think about what happens when you hear a piece of music, a good piece of 
music, that was meant to be danced to.  The impulse to dance, or at least to participate in 
the dance in some way, by tapping your toes or clapping your hands, is almost 
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irresistible.  How should we think about this phenomenon?  We could describe it in rather 
clinical terms by saying simply, “It is an observable fact that most people exposed to 
music with a pronounced rhythm tend to engage in rhythmic behavior in synchrony with 
the music.”  What this leaves out, of course, is the subjective side of the experience, what 
it feels like to have this experience.  According to classical behaviorists, that is an 
advantage.  They believe that scientific explanation requires that we limit ourselves to 
what is observable by a non-participant observer—a third-person explanation, we might 
call it.  But most people have come to believe that that represents a highly artificial 
restriction.  The behaviorists wanted to be strict empiricists, but an honest empiricism has 
to admit that many phenomena can only be understood from the first-person perspective.  
If you do not grasp how the agent sees the action, you can give only a grossly 
impoverished explanation of the action itself. 
 All right, suppose we revert to the first-person perspective.  Shall we just describe 
the experience as I did initially?  When I hear this music, I feel like dancing.  That is 
certainly true, but does it leave out some important dimension of the experience?  If a 
poet were called upon to describe the experience, would he or she be satisfied with this?  
Surely not.  But is that because poets are inclined, by natural disposition or professional 
habit, to embellish the plain truth?  Or should we say that at least sometimes their 
embellishments capture a bit of truth that was already there, but eluded the plainer 
description?  There is a tradition in philosophy that regards any connection between 
poetry and truth as purely coincidental.  The same tradition sees the function of poetry, 
and music, and other arts, as essentially to express and evoke emotions.  Over the last 
century, and especially over the last thirty years, the concept of a neat distinction between 
reason and emotion has come under increasing criticism.  Lately, cognitive psychologists 
have acknowledged that emotions play an essential role in cognition.  Of course, this 
would not have been news to William James, but philosophers after James retreated to a 
narrower, more “positivistic” empiricism.  If we are now returning to a more Jamesian 
outlook, we can again raise a question which for much of the twentieth century would 
have been philosophical heresy. Do our emotions afford an avenue of access to 
information about the external world? 
 Let me return to my example to make this question clearer.  When the music 
begins, and I feel like dancing, is this feeling just a fact about me?  Or since I can tell that 
others share the feeling, is it just a fact about us?  The old-style empiricist would say that 
the only thing this feeling reveals about the music itself is the fact that music of this sort 
tends to affect people in this way.  In other words, my feeling reveals only an extrinsic 
property of the music—what Hume would call a “secondary” property—not a property 
that it possesses independent of the feeling—a “primary” property.  But should we accept 
the old-style empiricist’s verdict?  I claim that we should not.  My initial description of 
the experience—When I hear this music, I feel like dancing—certainly leaves itself open 
to the empiricist’s interpretation.  But once again, I must ask, is that the fullest or most 
accurate description? 
 The judgment as to which of two descriptions best captures the experience being 
described is not one that can be made mechanically.  Reflecting on one’s experience is 
itself an essentially perceptual experience.  When two people look at the same object, one 
may fail to register features of the object that the other notices, one may discern 
relationships among its parts to which the other is blind.  But perhaps blindness is the 
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wrong metaphor, for often no more is required than to point out the overlooked features 
to enable the “blind” observer to see them.  If that strategy fails, other techniques may be 
adopted to, as we say, “open one’s eyes.”  But no technique is foolproof.  You can try to 
get someone to see something by directing their attention to it.  But they must finally see 
it for themselves. 
 I think something like this is happening when we are struck by the aptness of a 
poet’s description.  The description is striking because we hadn’t seen things quite that 
way before.  It draws our attention to an aspect of the thing described that we had 
previously overlooked.  But by doing so, it enables us to see it.  Of course, it does not do 
this infallibly.  Sometimes I just don’t get it.  But when I do, I’m tempted to say, “Yes, 
that’s just exactly how it is, though I only half-realized it before.” 
 So, what I am now trying to claim, about the experience of hearing dance music, 
is that there is a better way of describing it than the way which leaves it open to the naïve 
empiricist criticism.  But the only way to persuade you of this is to offer a better 
description and hope you “get it.” 
 Back to the experience itself.  It would not be at all unnatural to say of the music 
that it is “enticing” or “inviting.”  I think this way of putting it captures something that 
other descriptions omit.  An integral part of the experience is the feeling that the music is, 
as it were, addressing me.  It calls out to me, it summons me to take part in it.  The 
impulse I feel to dance is not just a reaction I happen to have.  It is an apprehension of a 
possibility of relationship to the music.  It is at the same time an apprehension that there 
is something “there,” in the music, which both lends itself to such a relationship and, as I 
said before, invites my participation.  My reaction is simultaneously an awareness of 
what is there, offering itself to relationship, and a drive to respond affirmatively to this 
invitation.  Hence the “feeling” involved in “I feel like dancing” has a cognitive 
dimension.  It is at once both a motive and a mode of perception.  It’s this feeling that  
gives me reason to believe that the “something” I perceive in the music is really there.
 It seems to me that human experience at its most basic, and stripped of distorting 
preconceptions, exhibits this fundamental pattern of invitation and response.  The objects 
in the world are not experienced simply as existing out there.  They are experienced as 
inviting me into relationship, and my spontaneous response is to enter into that 
relationship.  Some philosophers will tell me that this experience is delusional.  But I 
don’t see why I should believe them.15 
 If I now ask myself, Why do I believe in human rights? I think the answer will 
sound remarkably similar to my account of responding to music.  Of course, first we must 
set aside the merely biographical explanations.  Yes, I believe in human rights because  
that’s what I was taught, and my upbringing is reinforced by the fact that discourse about 
human rights is widely accepted as legitimate.  But where is the empirical basis for this 
belief, what makes it genuinely mine rather than merely derivative from the opinions of 
others?  I have seen that there is something about a human being that calls for respect.  
This “something” is the property often referred to under the heading of “human worth” or 
“dignity.”  I think it must be a part of what was meant by saying that humans are created 
“in the image of God.”  Where have I seen this?  I’m sure it first became evident to me in 
close relationships with other people.  I think the worth of the other person is evident 
even to an infant, though the infant experiences it in an indefinite and inarticulate way.  
Except in the most dysfunctional families, family members are bound to each other by 
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mutual love.  And I submit that familial affection is the fundamental or primitive affect in 
which the independent value of another is perceived.  The child does not love its parents 
because they are useful, because they are sources of pleasure, or because they can be 
frightening when provoked.  I say this because injury done to a loved one is not 
experienced merely as a threat to a source of personal well-being.  It is experienced also 
as an act of disrespect toward what deserves to be respected.  When we speak of a 
physical injury as a violation of the “sanctity” of the person, that is no metaphor.  There 
is something about a person which an injustice violates. 
 I believe we see this first and most clearly in those who are closest to us.  And 
there is always a tendency for the strength of this feeling to vary in proportion to the 
closeness of our relationship with a person.  But one effect of being taught that all others 
are valuable, and of having this reinforced by the widespread acceptance of the idea, is 
that my attention has been brought to the fact that something of what I see in my nearest 
and dearest is there even in the most remote stranger.  There are moments when we are 
struck by a feeling of kinship to a stranger.  There are moments when we are being 
narrow-minded and someone reminds us that “they are people, too.”  There are moments 
when someone says to us, or we say to ourselves, “Remember, as you criticize or 
condemn this person, that you might have been such a person yourself.”  I do not think it 
is going too far to call what we see in the other person in such moments a kind of beauty 
or goodness.  It does not force itself on our perceptions.  If it did, the history of human 
atrocities would be much shorter than it is.  No, it is there, inviting us to recognize it and 
respond to it.  The invitation can be refused, and the worth of the other denied.  But 
surely that is a willful kind of blindness. 
 I am arguing that my belief in human rights is grounded in such “intuitions” of the 
independent and in some sense equal worth of all persons.  But this is not some 
mysterious mode of perception, or if you like, it is mysterious, but it is not at all 
uncommon.  Indeed, if my account of a very simple response to music is correct, this is 
perhaps the most common mode of experience of all, for it can be present as an element 
in almost any experience. 
 In the relationship to human beings there stands out an aspect of the experience 
which is inconspicuous in my reaction to music.  The response which is evoked in a 
perception of human worth may justly be described with words like “concern,” or “care,” 
or sometimes “love.”  There is an impulse to affirm, to nurture, to promote the good of 
the other.  I think there is an echo of this even in the musical experience.  I want the 
music to go on, I want to keep the beat.  I want it to come out right in the end.  Here again 
I think we have something which is common to our experiences of relationship, though 
the precise nature of the impulse, the precise nature of the concern that is appropriate and 
of the action in which this should be expressed varies with the object and with the 
circumstances. 
 To speak in this way is to lay oneself open to the charge of anthropomorphism.  It 
is quite clearly a matter of taking good human relationships as a model for our 
relationships to every other thing.  But I believe that an honest empiricism must admit 
that this attitude emerges spontaneously from our experience, and that a deliberate effort 
is needed to block it.  There is something common to our experiences of human relations 
and to our other experiences, and the commonality is so strong that it is easier to deny its 
existence altogether than to maintain its reality in human relations and deny its presence 
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elsewhere.  In sum, I believe we must either reject the notion of human worth as illusory, 
or confess that something similar to it is found everywhere. 
 To say this is by no means to abolish all distinctions of value.  I am not about to 
argue that the value of a cow or of an artwork is equal to that of a human being.  Nor am I 
arguing that the “something” that is common to all things admits of univocal definition.  
Qualitative differences of very radical sorts remain in place.  There are greater and lesser 
goods.  And sometimes—rather frequently, actually, sacrifices must be made.  
Sometimes the sacrifices required of us are very large.  The goods we must forego or 
even see destroyed are genuine goods, their loss a genuine loss.  This way of thinking 
does not at all deny that bad things happen or that people sometimes—too often—make 
evil choices.  To believe that beauty and goodness can be found everywhere is not 
necessarily to adopt a childish optimism or become blind to suffering.  But it is a crucial 
part of being a Platonist. 
 In characterizing this experience and drawing lessons from it, I have already 
begun to use language of the same sort I used in describing Platonism.  I have already 
begun to speak of the objects of my experience as partaking, in different ways and to 
different degrees, in some common source of value.  Call that value the form of the 
Good, and say that the goodness of all good things belongs to them by virtue of their 
participation in that form, and you have clearly become a bona fide Platonist. 
 I don’t think it’s necessary to belabor that point. I think you can see why I think 
that this talk about forms and participation gives fitting expression to our experiences of 
value.  If you are prepared to accept such experiences as providing a sufficient empirical 
basis for a Platonic ethics—and I do not pretend that my argument makes your 
acceptance inevitable—then I can go on to briefly survey how Platonic ethics responds to 
the needs of the day. 
 First, if my account is acceptable, then Platonism can claim the great strength of 
Utilitarianism.  It doesn’t quite qualify as “naturalistic” in the narrow sense, but it is 
founded on a common and readily accessible experience.  While I have not explained 
how this experience is possible, I believe its reality is evident.  It is not a special 
revelation vouchsafed only to a few, though it is possible that a great many of us have 
been trained to ignore it. 
 Second, this approach has the advantage over Utilitarianism—shares the 
advantage with Deontology—that it locates the value of things in the things themselves, 
making it independent of human perceptions and interests.  Unlike Deontology, however, 
it does not derive our obligations toward other things and other persons from some 
categorical imperative.  It views obligations, duties, rights, and so on, as attempts to 
articulate what the “intrinsic” value of things demands of us, what sort of behavior is 
called for by the invitations things issue to us, what kinds of respect represent an 
appropriate response to these invitations. 
 A Platonic ethics explains egalitarian principles by alleging that to be human is to 
participate in a particular way in the Good, and all our talk of human rights is but a way 
of expressing with fine detail and specificity the kind of treatment due to a creature which 
exhibits the Good in that way.  But in doing so, it need not deny the goodness of 
particular relationships in which others are valued for more than their mere humanity, 
relationships whose maintenance requires special responses which can be articulated as 
special obligations or priorities. 
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 A Platonic metaphysics of ethics is far from answering all of our ethical 
questions.  The doctrines I have enunciated do not obviously entail specific rights or 
duties.  They do not tell us how to assess the goodness of things, what responses are 
appropriate to different things, or how to adjudicate conflicts or competitions among 
goods.  But I think this is actually a strength of the theory.  Can you imagine a rule 
general enough to guide you in the raising of cattle, the raising of children, and the 
composition of a piece of music? A rule so general would afford very little information, 
like Aquinas’s first law of nature:  “Do good and avoid evil.”  The Good has many 
manifestations, and there are many ways of cultivating them.  You must learn what is 
good and what is good for it, and this learning has as many departments as there are 
aspects to our lives.  What is common to all these things eludes definition.  The hope of 
the Platonic philosopher is that we may ultimately see that there is but one voice which 
speaks to us in everything. 
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